Congress weighed measure to curtail scope of DHS intelligence office

The House Intelligence Committee privately considered adding a measure to the annual intelligence community authorization bill that would have significantly curtailed the size and scope of the Department of Homeland Security’s core spy agency, according to three people familiar with the matter and a summary of the drafted measure viewed by Nextgov/FCW.

All three sources requested anonymity because they were not permitted to discuss closed-door deliberations about the measure.

The statute — ultimately yanked from the final House draft of the Intelligence Authorization Act — would have prohibited the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis from both collecting and analyzing intelligence, according to two of the people and the draft summary. The measure also would have renamed it as the Office of Intelligence and Information Sharing and reduced its workforce from around 1,000 employees to no more than 250.

It’s not entirely clear why lawmakers backed down on the provision, though the proposal raised concerns among law enforcement groups, who relayed their misgivings to members on the House Homeland Security Committee, one of the people said. One top-of-mind concern was that I&A’s workflow would stagnate because the agency wouldn’t be able to produce original insights for its stakeholders, the person added.

The development, which has not been previously reported, highlights that Congress was weighing major overhauls for the lesser-known DHS spy bureau amid recent administration efforts to shed the office’s staffing count, and it adds a chapter to a storied history of debates over how to best reform the agency.

The proposed changes are notable because the measure would have effectively recast the DHS office as a clearinghouse for findings produced elsewhere in the intelligence community, stripping it of common authorities granted to other spy agencies who routinely collect and analyze information on threats concerning U.S. interests.

The Intelligence Authorization Act, which is reviewed annually to greenlight funding for U.S. spy agency programs, is currently in the conferencing stage, where House and Senate negotiators hammer out differences between each other’s versions of the legislation.

I&A was slated for major workforce reductions, Nextgov/FCW first reported in July. Those plans, which would have only kept some 275 people, soon drew major pushback from law enforcement associations and Jewish organizations that have long relied on the DHS agency to disseminate timely intelligence about threats that concern state, local, tribal and territorial communities. One international organization privately warned Congress that the proposed cuts would create “dangerous intelligence gaps.”

The downsizing was put on hold just days later, but since then, I&A has reignited efforts to more gradually shed its workforce. As of now, the office has around 500 or so full-time employees, one of the people said. The 500-person figure preserves more workers than the initial plans to cap the workforce at 275, though that still halves staffing from the around 1,000-person operation in place earlier this year.

U.S. spy agencies use various sources and methods to collect intelligence, such as electronic eavesdropping tools employed at the NSA or human spies via the CIA. Like many intelligence units, the exact collection methods used by I&A aren’t fully known because much of its work is marked classified or sensitive. 

An early 2025 policy manual shows I&A has analytic centers focused on counterterrorism, nation-state threats, cyber threats and border security. Its collection offices include a management division for unevaluated raw intelligence and a center used to help identify foreign or domestic actors who pose a threat to the nation.

The reduction plans at I&A initiated earlier this year came amid broader efforts by the Trump administration to shrink the federal workforce. But for years, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have argued that I&A needs major reform. The provision ultimately dropped from the intelligence authorization bill could have stemmed from those concerns.

Democrats have faulted the intelligence office for overstepping its domestic surveillance authorities and for failing to maintain robust civil liberties protections, especially during the 2020 racial justice protests. Republicans, meanwhile, have accused it of drifting into partisanship and falling short in providing timely intelligence to state and local partners, particularly on border threats.

A 2022 DHS oversight report also assessed I&A had advanced visibility into online threats before the January 6, 2021 Capitol riot but failed to elevate or share that information in time to be useful.

The Intelligence and Analysis office holds a unique place in the federal oversight landscape. As one of 18 intelligence agencies managed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, it falls within the purview of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. Its status as a DHS component also subjects it to oversight from the Homeland Security panels in both chambers.

I&A is also distinctive from other spy agencies because it focuses on domestic security matters. It manages a collection of fusion centers across the country, which serve localized intelligence hubs that bring together personnel from state and local governments.

A June intelligence memo describing Chinese hackers’ intrusions into a state’s National Guard networks was produced by I&A, though it cites findings that originated from the Defense Department, showing the DHS agency has previously disseminated intelligence not derived from its own sources and methods. It’s not clear how often this type of distribution occurs.

For years, I&A’s placement in DHS has put it at the center of recurring jurisdictional tensions with the FBI, which drives much of the nation’s domestic intelligence, counterterrorism and counterintelligence work under the Justice Department. 

Researchers have long argued the division of labor creates a fragmented domestic-threat architecture that splits analytic, collection and operational responsibilities across agencies whose missions too often overlap.

But amid broader efforts to reshape DHS under Trump 2.0, the proposed moves to narrow I&A go beyond a routine “course correction,” said Steven Cash, a former senior advisor to the under secretary for intelligence and analysis in DHS. 

By weakening the domestic-facing intelligence office built with explicit legal and privacy guardrails, he argued, Congress would risk creating a vacuum that could increase the chance of surveillance overreach — a dynamic common in nations like Russia, which have far less constrained domestic intelligence services.

“From its inception, I&A was not designed to replicate the FBI or to serve as a tactical warning shop chasing imminent threats. It was created to fill a strategic gap between the federal intelligence community and the state and local authorities who bear the daily responsibility for homeland security,” said Cash, now executive director at The Steady State, an organization of former U.S. national security workers focused on democracy and rule of law.

“The goal [of I&A] was straightforward: provide governors, mayors, police chiefs, transportation officials and emergency managers with intelligence-driven guidance — rooted in the full range of classified and unclassified reporting — to help them make long-term decisions. How much should a city invest in physical security? Does a state need new legal authorities? What training or equipment should local law enforcement prioritize?” Cash said. “No other federal entity is structured to deliver this kind of strategic, locally tailored intelligence support.”

I&A’s collection practices have always been a separate and more sensitive issue, he contended. 

“It has never been clear that its domestic collection authorities could be exercised meaningfully without pushing into areas that raise profound civil-liberties and constitutional concerns. That is why, across multiple administrations — starting with President George W. Bush — there was sustained attention to guardrails, oversight mechanisms and a clear understanding that DHS intelligence activities must not evolve into a national-level domestic surveillance service.”

Nextgov/FCW has reached out to DHS and both the House Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees for comment.